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Map of Somalia and Horn of Africa

Somalia. Bing Maps. Microsoft. July 13, 2015. Retrieved from
https://www.bing.com/maps/#Y3A9LTAuNDgwNjg3fjU3LjQxOTQzMiZsdmw9NSZzdHk9YiZxPVNvbWFsaWE=

HOA consists of: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia,
Greater HOA consists of: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Sudan
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Part I: Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Somalia Conflict/ Security Situation Overview
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Clarke, Walter S. “Background Information for Operation Restore Hope 1992-93.” SSI Special
Report AD-A259 777. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College. (approved for
public release) http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a259777.pdf
This report provides and in-depth history of Somalia starting with its independence and
providing information on clan history and organization, domestic politics, historical figures
and then concludes with a thorough list of significant dates in Somali history along a
chronology of Operation Restore Hope (pre-Mogadishu intervention)
MAPS REPORTS AND DATASETS
“Country Report: Somalia.” Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset. April 2013.
http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ACLED-CountryReport_Somalia_April-2013.pdf
This report reviews the impact of al-Shabaab and its areas of operation and the level of
conflict in different regions. It also presents the issues of communal conflict. The challenges
of the local government are examined with concern to the establishment of local
administration.

Zimmerman, Katherine. "Somalia Conflict Maps:Islamist and Political." AEI: Critical Threats. May
31, 2010. http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/somalia-conflict-maps-islamist-and-political.
The maps from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) featured in this article present the locations
of three particular Islamist groups in Somalia; al Shabaab, Hizb al Islam and Ahlu Sunna wa al
Jama’a and the different self-declared regions.

U.S. Department of State. ( N.D) “U.S. Bilateral Relations Fact Sheets.” U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/index.htm
4

The U.S. State Department fact sheets provide information on U.S. relations with the
particular country and any aid provided and U.S. representation in the country.
POLITICAL HISTORY AND U.S. POLICIES
Bruton, Bronwyn E. “Somalia: A New Approach.” Council Special Report. Council on Foreign
Relations. March 2010. http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421
This report outlines the political history involving the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) and al- Shabaab. It evaluates the U.S. policies regarding the country and the
effectiveness of its support of the TFG. The author describes a series of strategies to combat
terrorism in the region and to stabilize and develop the country.

CULTURE AND C LAN IDENTITY
Center for Security, Armed Forces and Society. “Somalia.” CEADS Papers, 2 (2012).
http://www.csfas.net/downloads/ceads_volume_2_-_ansa_in_somaila.pdf
This collection consists of five different papers on Somali culture, clan structure, and
religion, especially as they relate to non-state violence. Titles include, “Clan Identity and
Islamic Identity in Somalia: An Examination of Non-State Armed Groups in Regional and
Sub-Regional Context” and “Legitimacy Among the Somali: The Importance of Clan and
Islamic Identities in Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Any Eventual Solution.”

GROWTH/E STABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL ISLAM
“Somalia’s Islamists.” Africa Report 100 (December 2005) International Crisis Group.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-ofafrica/somalia/Somalias%20Islamists.pdf
This report from 2005 details the rise and expansion of political Islamism and the growth of
several groups, some more radical than others and the Sharia Court systems, that would pave
the way for al-Shabaab. The rise and collapse of al-Ittihaad al-Islaami (AIAI) resulted in a
few members establishing a new jihadi network with ties to al-Qaeda. It also discusses how
the Islamist groups were able to coordinate several different clans who had been at odds with
each other for a long time.
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CONFLICT REPORTS
Fergusson, James. The World’s Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia. Boston,
MA: Da Capo Press, 2013.
An in-depth recounting by James Ferguson, an imbedded journalist in Somalia, of his time in
Somalia observing the AMISOM military forces fight against Al-Shabaab. He covers a
wide variety of topics and provides a “front-line” look at the conflict. The book provides a
history into the conflict, interviews with many AMISOM soldiers, civilians, and local
journalists,

Historical Context
RUSSIA AND SOMALIA
Painter, David S. Cold War: An International History, Routledge, 1999.
This article discusses the aid provided to Somalia by the Soviets beginning in the 1960s. The
main objective of the aid was to strengthen the Soviets’ presence in the Indian Ocean by using
the port of Berbera. Somali forces invaded Ogaden in July 1977 after the U.S. pledged to
supply defensive weapons in the quest for a ‘Greater Somalia’. In November 1977, Soviets
sent military equipment, advisors, and Cuban troops into Ethiopia. Ogaden, the desert region
in Ethiopia inhabited by Somalis, remained a center of the separatist insurgency.

Khapoya, Vincent B. and Baffour Agyeman-Duah, The Cold War and Regional Politics in East
Africa, 1985. https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/viewFile/14668/15737
Soviet-Somali relations emerged from Siad Barre’s 1969 coup. By 1972, Soviet aid grew to
$50 million, a significant increase from $35 million in 1963. The soviets shifted their support
to Ethiopia in 1974 when the emperor was overthrown. Somalia used the Ethiopian emperor’s
death as a chance to seize Ogaden, the southeastern province of Ethiopia. The U.S. was
permitted access to the Soviet-built air and naval stations in Berbera by mid-1980.

SIAD BARRE
Castro, Alfonso Peter. “Cousins and gunmen.” World and I 9, no. 3 (March 1994): 268.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9407062371&site=ehostlive
6

This article provides a look at the crisis in Somalia with particular focus on the dictatorship of
Siad Barre and his experiments with socialism, “modernization” removal of the tribal/clan
system and harsh repression of any opponents while simultaneously ensuring that his clan and
its allies were in a position of power. It concludes with information on programs to rebuild the
economy and agriculture as well as a need to disarm the various militias and tribal groups.
CIVIL WAR AND SECESSIONS
Bakonya, Jutta. “Moral Economies of Mass Violence:Somalia 1988-1991.” Civil War 11, no 4.
(December 2009): 434-454. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698240903403790
This article is covers that start and growth of the Somali war between 1988 and 1992. It then
examines the expansion of the war to different regions and the mass-upheaval in Mogadishu
1990/91. The role of clan-affiliation and its impact on the spread of violence and their role in
insurgent groups.

Balthasar, Dominik. “The Wars in the North and the Creation of Somaliland.” World Peace
Foundation. October 28, 2013. http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/10/28/the-wars-inthe-north-and-the-creation-of-somaliland/
This report covers the Somali Civil War and the continuous conflicts throughout the 1980’s
and into the 90’s culminating with the creation of Smaliland.

TNG AND TFG
Government Recognition in Somalia and Regional Political Stability in the Horn of Africa, The
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40, No. 2 (June 2002), pp. 247-272.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876279
This article examines the Transitional National Government (TNG) and the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG). The TNG emerged from the May-Aug 2000 Somali National
Peace Conference in Arta. Delegates adopted a provisional constitution and a Transitional
National Assembly of 225 people. The TFG was declared in 2004 and Abdullahi Yusuf was
elected as president in October 2004. His pro-Ethiopian and anti-Islamist stances sparked
hardline Islamists to organize a support base. Al-Shabaab engaged in political assassinations
targeting TFG collaborators and hostilities against the Western-backed government in
Mogadishu began to rise. Due to the inability of both the TNG and TFG to extend its authority
7

throughout Somalia, warlords continued to control portions of territory throughout the
country.
U.S. AND SOMALIA AND U.S. INTERVENTION
OVERVIEW AND POLICIES

Schraeder, Peter J. “U.S. intervention in the Horn of Africa amidst the end of the Cold War.” Africa
Today 40, no 2. (2nd Quarter 1993):7.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=9311080970&site=ehostlive
This in-depth article provides a look at U.S. policies regarding Somalia during the Cold War
and how they shifted from a hands-off, limited involvement into direct military intervention
following a UN humanitarian initiative. The article moves on to further evaluate the decisions
and results regarding U.S. intervention (Operation Restore Hope) and the impact they might
make on future U.S. involvement in the region.
OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

“Humanitarian mission to Somalia.” U.S. Department of State Dispatch 3, no. 49: 855.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9301250310&site=ehostlive
Address by President George Bush describing the need for an intervention in Somalia, the
goals of the coalition forces and the limited mission duration.

Cooling, Norman L. "Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia: A Tactical Action Turned Strategic
Defeat." Marine Corps Gazette 85, no. 9 (09, 2001): 92-106,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/221430576?accountid=322
This source begins by providing an overview of the critical events that led Somalia to the
point where foreign intervention was needed. It then gives a thorough description of the
events of the U.S. role in Mogadishu, the tactical plan, intelligence, the execution of the raid,
command and control and lessons learned.
Dworken, Jonathan T. “Rules of engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope.” Military Review 74, no. 9
(September 1994): 26.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=9411220389&site=ehostlive
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This article examines concerns and issues regarding the Rules of Engagement utilized by U.S.
forces in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope and the lessons learned from them. It also
provides a brief overview of the situation that warranted the operation and the threats faced.

UNION OF ISLAMIC C OURTS
OVERVIEW/PROFILE

“Profile: Somalia’s Islamic Courts.” BBC News, June 6, 2006.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm
This brief profile gives an introduction into the 11 Islamic courts making up the Union of
Islamic Courts/Islamic Courts Union. As of June 2006, relatively soon after the courts had
come to power, the article describes the courts’ perception in Somalia, their role, and possible
radical links.

Barnes, Cedric and Harun Hassan. “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts.” Journal of
eastern African Studies 1, no. 2 (July 2007): 151-160.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531050701452382
The history and the origins of the Islamic courts are provided in this article, tracing them
from their origins in 1990 until their destruction in 2007. While the courts provided some
form of law and order in Mogadishu, their harsh tactics and extremist leanings led to their
downfall at the hands of an Ethiopian invasion.

UIC/ICU AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Mwangi, Oscar Gakuo. “The Union of Islamic Courts and Security Governance in Somalia.” African
Security Review 19, no. 1 (March 2010): 88-84.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=53466404&site=ehost-live
This article discusses the role that the Union of Islamic Courts played in provided public
services and local security versus that of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The
TFG was designed to serve as a coalition government consisting of members from four of the
largest Somali clans and a combination of representatives from a collection of smaller clans.
The UIC originated in clan courts and was run by Islamic clerics. The Supreme Council
which oversaw the courts persuaded different groups to assign members to form a combined
militia force. This militia force was integral in defeated the rival warlords and led to the
9

growth of the courts and sharia law along with the growth and radicalization of the militia.
While the courts sought to purvey some sense of order, their aggressive morality policing and
harsh punishments caused the general populace to feel that their fundamental rights and
freedoms were being violated and led to the UIC’s undoing.
LOCAL SUPPORT OF THE COURTS

Samatar, Abdi Ismail. Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, US Warlordism, and AU Shame, Review of
African Political Economy, Vol. 34, No. 111, Debates on the left in Southern Africa (March 2007),
pp. 155-165. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20406369
This article examines the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)’s reaction to the UN Security
Council’s authorization of a peacekeeping force in Somalia. That author argues against the
invasion and claims that the UIC provided a more stable and less corrupt system of
government , and that Somalia did not need foreign intervention. The UIC’s lightly armed
militia and the chaotic internal organization in Somalia allowed for U.S.- and British-backed
Ethiopian forces to overtake territories from insurgents in Mogadishu.

WARLORDS VS. UIC/ICU

Hirsch, Michael., and Jeffrey Bartholet. “ Fighting in the Shadows.” Newsweek 147, no. 23 (June 5,
2006): 36-38.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=20968787&site=ehost-live
This article covers the fight for control of Mogadishu that took place between the armed wing
of the Islamic Courts Union, aka Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the secular Warlords who
supposedly received U.S. support.
GOVERNANCE /FAILED STATE
LACK OF FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT

Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without Government in Somalia.” International Security 31, no. 3
(Winter 2006): 74-106.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=23814988&site=ehost-live
This in-depth report examines the lack of a fully functioning government in Somalia since
1991 and the events influencing this including a war with Ethiopia, an already crumbling
infrastructure, the reduction and removal of Cold-War era foreign aid and a multi-year civil
war. Menkhaus covers the attempts to formulate a transitional federal government (TFG) and
the role of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)/sharia courts and the Supreme Council of
10

Islamic Courts (SCIC) in undermining the TFG and seeking to insert their own brand of
governance. The original sharia courts were controlled by a coalition of local interests and
operated within Somali customs as opposed to superseding them.

Regional Terrorist/Insurgent/Militant Groups
AL-SHABAAB
GENERAL INFORMATION/OVERVIEW/BACKGROUNDER

“Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
2060 (2012): Somalia. “ S/2013/413, United Nations Security Council. July 12, 2013.
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/413
This report from the UNSC provides a very in-depth look at al-Shabaab, its tactics, goals,
finances, leadership (as of 2013) and structure.
Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/alshabaab
This website provided a wide variety of information on al-Shabaab, including its tactics, lists
of its attacks and leaders and lots of multimedia. The multimedia provides footage of
propaganda, interviews, training camps, attacks, and news reports on their attacks. A timeline
of al-Shabaab’s attacks is also provided.

Hansen, Stig Jarle. Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group,
2005-2012. Oxford University Press, 2013.
This book goes in-depth into the history of al-Shabaab, starting with its growth in the ICU and
separation in 2007. This look at the group shows it as a hybrid organization that not only is an
Islamic group but also a Somali nationalistic group by utilizing firsthand field research and
interviews with al-Shabaab members.

Masters, Jonathan. “Backgrounder: Al-Shabab.” Council on Foreign Relations. July 9, 2013.
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650
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This background report provides an initial overview of Al-Shabab including its origins and an
interactive timeline regarding the group’s development. Also included are sections on AlShabab’s leadership, tactics, motivation, and relationship with core Al Qaeda.
Also see the timeline of al-Shabaab’s growth and development, starting with the founding of
the ICU and including CT programs against it and ending with the Westgate attack.
http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/timeline-al-shabab/p31468

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Harnisch, Christopher. “The Terror Threat From Somalia: The Internationalization of Al Shabaab.”
Critical Threats Project, American Enterprise Institute. February 12, 2010.
http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_Fro
m_Somalia_Shabaab_Internationalization.pdf
This report from the American Enterprise Institute provides an in-depth look into the origins
and aspects of al-Shabaab up to 2010. Topics covered include the group’s origins, how it
gained control, connections to al-Qaeda, international recruiting, threat level, and a timeline of
attacks and assassinations conducted by or claimed by Al-Shabaab. Early on in the document
a list of ranking individuals associated with al-Shabaab and its affiliates is presented followed
by a series of maps.
OPERATIONS/TACTICS

The National Counterterrorism Center. “Al-Shabaab.” National Counterterrorism Center 2014
Calendar. (n.d.). http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html
This page provides a concise overview of al Shabaab’s history, area of operations and
associated attacks. The site also provides a map of Al-Shabaab’s locations and links to U.S.
State Department Fact Sheets.
Also see CNN and the BBC’s Q&As on the group:
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/21/world/africa/somalia-al-shabaab-explainer/index.html
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689

Crawford, Alex. “ ‘White Widow’ Lethwaite ‘Key’ in Al Shabaab.” Sky News, October 11, 2013.
http://news.sky.com/story/1152971/white-widow-lewthwaite-key-in-al-shabaab
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This article summarizes the contents of a 35-page Kenyan intelligence report on Al Shabaab.
It describes the report as giving a detailed description of how Al Shabaab operates throughout
Africa along with how it recruits and utilizes cells in different countries across the continent.
The article also notes Kenyan intelligence’s identification of the British “white widow”
Samantha Lethwaite and her involvement with an Al-Shabaab terror cell. This cell is coordinated by Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir.

Bergen, Peter. “How Al-Shabaab Picks Its Targets.” CNN, September 23, 2013.
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/21/opinion/al-shabaab-aims/index.html
Frames Shabaab’s September 2013 attack of an upscale mall in Nairobi as consistent with the
group’s anti-Western agenda, hostility toward Kenya, and desire to remain relevant. For more
on the significance of the Nairobi attack, see this NYT article, which underscores Shabaab’s
fractured organizational structure and weakened operational capabilities inside Somalia:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/world/africa/kenya-mall-carnage-shows-shababresilience.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
ESTABLISHING AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT

Mwangi, Oscar Gakuo. “State Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia.”
Politics, Religion, & Ideology 13, no. 4 (December 2012): 513-527.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=83933546&site=ehost-live
This article explores the relationship between the collapse of local government, and the
following void allowing for the growth and entrenchment of Al-Shabaab. During this period
Al-Shabaab has sought to delegitimize the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and
legitimize their organization. Al-Shabaab utilized Somali nationalism, Islamism as politics,
propaganda, and social services in order to makes themselves appear as a viable alternative to
the TFG. There is a thorough analysis of “Salafi” Islamism and how it is utilized by groups to
legitimize their actions. The development and role of Al-Shabaab’s precursors such as the
Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and Al-Ittihaad Al-Islamiah (AIAI) are examined and
discussed as well, especially Al-Shabaab’s role as a militaristic youth group in the UIC.
LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS
KAMPALA

Pippard, Tim. “Al-Shabab’s Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks.” CTC Sentinel.
July 3, 2010. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-shabab%E2%80%99s-agenda-in-the-wakeof-the-kampala-suicide-attacks
13

Al-Shabaab conducted a multi-pronged attack in the Ugandan capital of Kampala in an effort
to prove its worth to al-Qaeda and expands its presence to the greater Horn of Africa, outside
of its normal operating areas. These outside attacks are seen as a movement of the group to
advance itself from a local, nationalistic group to a global forced focused on jihad.

ATTACKS ON UN COMPOUND IN JUNE 2013 IN MOGADISHU

Yusuf, Mohammed. “Al-Shabab Gunmen Attack UN Compound in Mogadishu.” VOA, June 19,
2013. http://www.voanews.com/content/alshabab-gunmen-attack-un-compound-inmogadishu/1684664.html
An attack on the UN compound in Mogadishu that killed at least 15 people was led off by a
suicide attack and then followed by a direct assault by al-Shabaab. Following the attack, fire
was exchanged for several hours between al-Shabaab and U.N. security forces. A few months
prior, al-Shabaab had killed 30 people in an attack on the Supreme Court complex in
Mogadishu.

WESTGATE MALL

Howden, Daniel. “Terror in Westgate Mall: The Full Story of the Attacks That Devastated Kenya,”
The Guardian. October 4, 2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya-terror
This article presents a succinct overview of the 80-hour siege by al-Shabaab militants at the
Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Interviews with survivors, their relatives, and members of
the Kenyan security forces detail infighting and incompetence among the authorities. A clash
of egos among Kenyan authorities impaired a swift response to neutralize the insurgents,
highlighting the need for security sector reform and improving the mobilization of assets
within the Kenyan security forces.
FEBRUARY 2014 ATTACK ON PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

Nor, Omar and Laura Smith-Spark. “Al-Shabaab militants attack Somali presidential palace in
Mogadishu.” CNN, February 21, 2014. http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/21/world/africa/somaliaattack/
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Following similar tactics, al-Shabaab used an explosion to breach the gate and exchanged fire
with security forces. Somalia’s security minister, Adbikarin Hussein Guled stated that at least
12 people were killed in the attack but out of this number, seven were al-Shabaab members.
MAY 14 ATTACK ON A RESTAURANT IN DJIBOUTI

Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Henry Appel. “Al-Shabaab Strikes in Djibouti.” War on the Rocks.
June 3, 2014.
On May 24, 2014 a man and a woman detonated explosives they had hidden under their clothes
at a restaurant in Djibouti popular with NATO members and other peacekeeping forces. One
person was killed and 11 were wounded. This was the first suicide bombing in the history of
Djibouti. The article describes when Djibouti is significant militarily in the fight against alShabaab and shows the growth in al-Shabaab attacks outside of Somalia in 2014.

JUNE 2014 ATTACK AND SIEGE IN MPEKETONI KENYA

“Kenya attack: Mpeketoni near Lamu hit by al-Shabab raid.” BBC, June 16, 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27862510
Members of al-Shabaab attacked Mpeketoni in force. At least 48 people were killed during the
attacks in which al-Shabaab throw bombs into buildings and restaurants and systematically
executed Christians and Kenyans. Many people were out in town watching the world cup
games.
GARISSA UNIVERSITY

Hatcher, Jessica and Kevin Sieff. “Al-Shabab attacks Kenyan university, killing at least 147.”
Washington Post, April 2, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/70-killedhundreds-rescued-after-kenya-university-attack-by-al-shabab-militants/2015/04/02/0c554516d951-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html
The attack on Garissa University in Kenya conducted by al-Shabaab in April of 2015 resulted
in the deaths of over 140 students. Reports indicate that at least 79 students were injured
during the attack. Gunmen, four in total, stormed the dormitories in the early morning and all
four were killed after a 15 hour long siege by security forces. There had been initial threats
made in the past by al-Shabaab that they were going to attack the university and students had
been evacuated in the past due to the potential threat.
Sheikh, Abdi., and Feisal Omar. “Al Shabaab militants attack Somali army base, say dozens dead.”
Reuters, January 15, 2016.
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http://in.reuters.com/article/somalia-attacks-idINKCN0UT0EY
Al-Shabaab attacked a Somali army base, housing African Union (AMISOM) peacekeeping
forces, in the town of Ceel Cadde near the border with Kenya. The base was overrun and
AMISOM forces are counterattacking while in turn, Al-Shabaab claims to have killed 60
AMISOM soldiers. With the loss of the base, also came the loss of almost 30 trucks and
armored vehicles.

SOCIAL MEDIA/ONLINE PRESENCE / PROPAGANDA

“Al-Shabab showed gruesome social media savvy during attack.” CBS/AP, September 24, 2013.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-shabab-showed-gruesome-social-media-savvy-duringattack/
This article describes the group’s use of Twitter during its attack on the Westgate Mall in
Nairobi. It reports that Shabaab militants sent out numerous tweets taunting the Kenyan
military, praising the attack and threatening more violence. It notes that the group repeatedly
started a new feed each time the social media company shut down its account and tailored its
messages to specific audiences. Tweets were sent out in both Somali and English. These
actions are seen to be consistent with the group’s “aggressively public” posture.
Also see this Long War Journal article outlining the differences between authentic and
inauthentic Shabaab tweets http://www.longwarjournal.org/threatmatrix/archives/2013/09/are_you_looking_at_an_official.php
INTERNAL DIVISIONS/SETBACKS
Meleagrou-Hitchens, A. and Hussain Solomon. “Factors Responsible for Al-Shabab’s Losses in
Somalia.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. September 26, 2012.
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/factors-responsible-for-al-shababs-losses-in-somalia
This article examines what the author sees as the three primary factors behind al-Shabab’s
setbacks. These factors are the successful model provided by AMISOM, clan rivalries within
al-Shabab and al-Shabab’s mishandling of the regional drought in 2011. It also identifies the
challenges facing the Somali government as it begins to strengthen its position against alShabab.
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Hansen, Stig Jarle. “An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions.” CTC Sentinel. February
24, 2014. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/an-in-depth-look-at-al-shababs-internal-divisions
This article evaluates the results and implications of the infighting among Al-Shabab
members. It also reviews the role Al-Shabaab plays in the local economy and its impact on
and utilization of Tribal politics and rivalries.

Rosen, Armin. “How Africa’s Most Threatening Terrorist Group Lost Control of Somalia.” The
Atlantic,
September 21, 2012. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/how-africasmost-threatening-terrorist-group-lost-control-of-somalia/262655/
Brief piece outlining factors behind Shabaab’s 2011-2012 decline, including “famine,
unprecedented African military cooperation, and [the group’s] own medieval rule.”
“Somalia’s al-Shabaab: Down But Not Out.” The George Washington University: Homeland Security
Policy Institute, HSPI Issue Brief 22, August 27, 2013.
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrief217_222_AfricaSecuritySeries.cfm
Argues that internal divisions, alienation of the local population, and sustained CT efforts by
domestic and international forces have significantly weakened the group, but that it remains a
significant threat to Somalian security. Provides information on the group’s rise and its
relationship with various Somali clans, as well as its governance structures (including the
organization’s internal power struggles), messaging strategies, and links with outside groups.
(check to see if duplicated)
LEADERS/HIGH PROFILE MEMBERS
AHMED GODANE (MUKHTAR ABU ZUBAIR) (KILLED 2014)

Anzalone, Christopher. "The Life and Death of Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed Godane." CTC Sentinel.
September 29, 2014. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-life-and-death-of-al-shabab-leaderahmed-godane.
This article provides a background on Ahmed Godane, Al-Shabab’s leader until his death in
September of 2014. Godane studied in Sudan and Pakistan and was believed to have been
turned to militant Islam during his time in Pakistan. Godane’s involvement in the Islamic
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Courts Union and rise to leadership saw the expansion of al-Shabab’s territorial control. In
conclusion, the article speculates whether al-Shabab will dissolve due to the lack of Godane’s
leadership
AHMED UMAR (ABU UBAIDAH)

West, Sunguta. “Al-Shabaab to Face Different Direction after Appointment of New Leader.”
Terrorism Monitor. 12, no. 21 (2014): The Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43060&tx_ttne
ws%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=52620b3e9602e94d93816058fb04a416#.VH4b9DHF98E
This article describes al-Shabaab’s new leader, Shaykh Ahmad Umar (a.k.a Abu Ubaidah) and
speculates what his impact on the group will be. The policies of the previous leader, Godane,
are reviewed and the attacks perpetrated by al-Shabaab are included. The article concludes by
stating that Umar has not indicated a new direction for al-Shabaab yet, but he will have to
manage the clan politics within the group in order to continue operations.

MOHAMED ABDIKADIR MOHAMED (IKRIMA)

Cruickshank, Paul and Tim Lister. “U.S. target in Somalia: An inside story on an Al-Shabaab
commander.” CNN, October 7, 2013. ihttp://www.cnn.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/somaliaal-shabaab-commander/
This article provides a background on Mohamed Abdikadir Mohamed (Ikrima) and his
alleged involvement in different operations including recruiting in Kenya and allegedly in
Europe.
ADDITIONAL PROFILES

Al Shabaab leadership Profiles. Critical Threats. American Enterprise Institute.
http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/al-shabaab-leadership
A collection of profiles on several key figures in al-Shabaab leadership.
West, Sunguta. “Al-Shabaab Leader’s Fires Audio Message Suggests Morale is Low Among Somali
Militants.” Terrorism Monitor 14, no. 16 (August 5, 2016). Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45713&tx_ttnews%5BbackPi
d%5D=7&cHash=229f889655d8b23785f1bef0b5620cc3
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Al-Shabaab leader, Sheikh Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah, had re-emerged after almost two
years of silence to a message of inspiration to his forces which have been facing defeats at
the hands of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A unique aspect of this
message was the specific labeling of Turkey as an enemy of al-Shabaab and Somalia. While
claiming Turkey has invaded Somalia, it has been involved in reconstruction work and aiding
displaced persons. In response to its setbacks, al-Shabaab has shifted its tactics to included
VBIED attacks which has allowed for some successful attacks against AMISOM bases.
PUSHBACK AND RESURGENCE
Meservey,Joshua. “Al Shabab’s Resurgence: Why its Campaign of Terror will Likely Accelerate.”
Foreign Affairs. January 3, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2017-0103/al-shabab-s-resurgence
Al-Shabaab has mainly relegated itself to the southern regions of Somalia and launching
strikes into Kenya as well. After coordinated CVE efforts against them and a minor schism
over AQAP vs. ISIS allegiance, the group had undergone a temporary setback. In the summer
of 2016 Al-Shabaab launched a new series of attacks targeting military and government
officials. The goals of these attacks were to disrupt the elections for parliamentary positions
and the president and to find a new haven in the north. A disrupted election process keeps the
country in chaos and allows Al-Shabaab to claim the legal government if illegitimate. The
push into the north serves the dual-purpose of providing an escape route for Al-Shabaab as
they face more defeats in the south and establishing a stronghold to launch attacks against the
schism Al-Shabaab group that pledged to ISIS. Another concerning factor of the push north is
the renewed attempts at making a stronger connection with AQAP in Yemen. A direct line to
AQAP could give Al-Shabaab the resources it needs to re-solidify its presence in the south.

Al-Shabaab in Neighboring Countries
KENYA
AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT FACTORS

Botha, Anneli. “Political Socialization and Terrorist Radicalization Among Individuals who Joined
al-Shabaab in Kenya. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 11 (2014): 895-919.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.952511
The increasing presence of al-Shabaab in Kenya has led to enhanced CT efforts and growing
local concern. Following two separate attacks in 2014 Kenyan authorities rounded up several
thousand “Somali looking” individuals in an attempt to identify any members of or persons
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sympathetic to al-Shabaab. This article evaluates the impact of that particular tactic and
several other factors and the roles they could play in increased radicalization. The role of
peers/friends is seen to have played a significant role in the growth of al-Shabaab in Kenya
based on a survey conducted there. The results show that 71% joined with their friends and
54% of existing members worked to recruit their friends with only 6% joining with their
family and 23% joined of their own accord. In addition, the results show that introduction to
al-Shabaab was mainly through friends, 38% however, 34% stated that they were introduced
to the group by a religious figure. The factor of the local economy or the lack there of is a
frequent area of CT research , however, according to the figures in Anneli’s report, 87% of
Kenyans who joined al-Shabaab cited religion as their reason for joining while only 4% cited
economic reasons.

West, Sunguta. “Al-Shabaab Recruitment from Kenyan Universities Alarms Officials.” Terrorism
Monitor 14, no. 1 (January 7, 2016). Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44951&tx_ttnews%5BbackPi
d%5D=7&cHash=dacdb46fa2777f715aae13d3e578a0b3
Al-Shabaab’s recruiting tactics have changed as its position has changed due to increased
success of the AMISOM mission against them. Al-Shabaab initially focused on poor areas
and recruited youth with few options by offering them money and a form of employment.
The same concept is being applied but to a different group who are also in need of those two
incentives, students. College students and recent graduates (mainly in Kenya) have served as
susceptible targets for recruitment since they are offered a salary and upkeep costs for their
family. Al-Shabaab has expressed interest in developing chemical weapons and this may be
an aspect of their luring in students with engineering and chemistry backgrounds.

CVE/POLICE TACTICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON RECRUITMENT

Iaccino, Ludovica. “Al-Shabaab’s Ranks Swelling Thanks to Kenyan Police Brutality Towards
Somali Migrants.” International Business Times, June 5, 2015. http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/alshabaads-ranks-swelling-thanks-kenyan-police-brutality-towards-somali-migrants-1504064
There is concern that harsh measures utilized by Kenyan police as part of counterterrorism
tactics are resulting in more Somali youth becoming radicalized and joining al-Shabaab.
Somali immigrants in Kenya report having been targeted by Kenyan forces and claim regular
human rights abuses. Officials in Garissa spoke out against photos taken of police officers
beating Somalis and stated that those involved will face disciplinary action upon confirmation
of the incident.
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“Kenyan Forces Accused of Smuggling Racket in Somalia.” VOA, November 12, 2015.
http://www.voanews.com/content/kenya-forces-deny-smuggling-racket-somalia/3054543.html
Kenyan Defense Forces are claimed by regional group, Journalists for Justice, to be involved
in a smuggling operation involving the illicit sale and transportation of charcoal and sugar. A
similar operation was carried out by al-Shabaab and all imports of both sugar and charcoal
were banned from Somalia in an attempt to stem this and crack down on smuggling. Kenyan
Defense Forces have a base in the port of Kismayu and reportedly have been using this base
as a staging area for smuggling potentially making up to $50 million a year and the untracked
funds could go to financing the very group they are fighting.

TANZANIA
Bariyo, Nicholas. “Tanzania Raid Nets 11 With Al-Shabaab Links.” The Wall Street Journal, October
9, 2013.
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304500404579125542093731738
Describes an Oct. 2013 counter-terrorism raid in Tanzania’s southern Mtwara region. Reports
that local security forces arrested 11 men, suspected Uamsho militants carrying Shabaab
training manuals and assault rifles, who Tanzanian authorities say were planning an attack on
Chinese construction workers in the area. Notes that some Tanzanians doubt their
government’s attempt to link Uamsho (a separatist movement comprised of Tanzanian
Muslims) and Shabaab, and argue instead that local security forces are on edge and quick to
make arrests because of popular opposition to the Chinese-funded natural gas pipeline under
construction in the country

Foreign Fighters
OVERVIEW /COMMON ORIGINS OF F OREIGN FIGHTERS
Vidino, Lorenzo, Raffaello Pantucci, and Evan Kohlmann. “Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of
Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict.” African
Security 3, no. 4 (October 2010): 216-238.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=55474511&site=ehost-live
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This report looks at how al-Shabaab used the conflict in Somalia to present their ideals and
goals as a form of religious obligation or sacred activity in order to garner additional support
and financing. The history leading up to and the forming of al-Shabaab is briefly covered
along with its ideology and then a section on the origins of foreign fighters. The United
States, Canada, Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden are all mentioned with regards to the
numbers and actions of recent immigrants and citizens who joined or tried to join al-Shabaab.
The report concludes with examining whether the motives of foreign fighters were religious or
nationalistic.

“Briton Thomas Evans Among al-Shabab Fighters Killed in Kenya.” BBC, June 15, 2015.
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-33133896
British born Thomas Evans, converted to Islam and changed his name to Abdul Hakim. He
initially tried to travel to Kenya and was turned back by airport police but he then traveled to
Egypt and was able to make his way to Somalia and joined al-Shabaab. Evans was killed in
an attack on a Kenyan military base. There are believed to be at least 50 British citizens
fighting for al-Shabaab.

Dickey, Christopher. “Nairobi Mall Attack: Al Shabaab’s Scandinavian Connection.” Newsweek,
October 19, 2013. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/10/19/nairobi-mall-attack-alshabaab-s-scandinavian-connection.html
Reports that a Norwegian citizen, 23-year-old Hassan Abdi Dhuhulow, may have been among
the militants responsible for the Sept. 2013 Westgate attack. Mentions other Islamist militants
with ties to Scandinavia. Frames Dhuhulow as “typical of what counter-terrorism analysts
call ‘generation 1.5’ immigrants—born abroad, but raised from early childhood in their new
countries. As teenagers, many are unsure of their identities, their allegiances and their futures,
and thus become easy prey for recruiters from Al-Shabaab or other radical organizations who
claim to give them a purpose in life, even if that is only an early death as a suicide bomber.”
Also see this brief report on the BBC’s list of 47 Britons with links to Shabaab and similar
organizations: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24639648

PURGE OF F OREIGN RECRUITS
Pantucci, Raffaello, and A.R. Sayyid. “Foreign Fighters in Somalia and al-Shabaab’s Internal Purge.”
Terrorism Monitor, December 03, 2014.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=94400048&site=ehost-live
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(update this description) The article reports on the released of a video entitle "It's an eye for an
eye: The Woolwich attacks." The video features 10 British jihadis who had died fighting
alongside al-Shabaab organization and one Somali-Norwegian carrying out the massacre at
Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. It confirms the role of foreign firefighters inside the East
African terrorist network.

Jenkins, Brian Michael. “Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist
Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11.” Santa, Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011.
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP343.pdf
(give a brief description) See pages 12-14 for discussion of al-Shabab’s recruitment of
Somali-Americans. Also see these pieces on the 2013 killing of Omar Hammami – “the
Alabama-born ‘jihadist rapper’” – by his fellow Shabaab members:
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2013/09/omar-hammami-terroristsuspect-killed-in-somalia and
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/09/shabaab_kills_americ.php
AL-HIJRA
Nzes, Fredrick. “Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s Affiliate in Kenya.” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 5 (2014): 24.
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-hijra-al-shababs-affiliate-in-kenya
This article describes the formation of Al-Hijra in Kenya. This group started as counseling and
community center in the form of the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) and over time formatted ties
with Al-Shabab. According to the article, Al-Hijra has served as a fund raising and recruiting
center for Al-Shabab, targeting Kenyan youths. The organization officially changed its name
from the MYC to Al-Hijra in 2012.

Finances/Smuggling/Criminal Activity
SUGAR
Boniface, Bosire. “Sugar Imports from Somalia Fund al-Shabaab, Kenyan Officials Say.” Sabahi,
April 24, 2013.
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2013/04/24/feature-01
This report discusses how al-Shabaab militants have compensated for their September 2012
loss of Kismayo by posing as traders and selling Somali-produced sugar to Kenyan
merchants. It is noted that much of the $1.2 billion/year trade is not declared to Kenyan
customs officials and is used by Shabaab to smuggle weapons as well as raise revenue.
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CHARCOAL
Anderson, Jessica L. “Forget Ivory, Africa’s al-Shabaab Terrorists Are Getting Rich on Coal in
Somalia.” Defense One. June 8, 2015. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/06/forgetivory-africas-al-shabaab-terrorists-are-getting-rich-coal-somalia/114673/?oref=d-river
The threat of poaching and smuggling is a serious concern in East Africa and there are
reported ties to ivory smuggling and al-Shabaab financing. These reports have been brought
into question due to a lack of concrete evidence, however, charcoal have served as a
significant source of al-Shabaab financing for years. Sales of charcoal to Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Yemen and other areas have resulted in $38-$56 million in revenue
annually. Additional funds come from smuggling sugar and extorting taxes and fees from
businesses.

“The Charcoal Conundrum: Ending the Somali Illegal Charcoal Trade.” The Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized Crime. http://www.globalinitiative.net/somalia-charcoal/
Based on reports from the UN Security Council (UNSC), more than 40% of al-Shabaab’s
funding comes from illegal charcoal sales. The charcoal is shipped from Somali ports through
vessels that are registered to other States leading to the belief that this is a larger transnational
issue. There is also an environmental concern due to the resulting deforestation and
desertification which hurts Somalia’s main export of livestock. The UNSC placed sanctions
on the importation of illegal Somali charcoal however these sanctions are regularly avoided.
The article ends by offering advice on how to stop the illegal charcoal trade.

Manson, Katrina. “UN Pushes Gulf to Cut Off al-Shabaab Economic Lifeline in Somalia.” Financial
Times, September 13, 2013. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/09fd06f4-1c61-11e3-a8a300144feab7de.html#axzz2fiQ7wbM4
The article describes UN efforts to pressure Gulf importers of Somali charcoal to stop doing
business with Shabaab, reported to have earned more than $25 million from the charcoal trade
in 2011 alone. (Subscription required)
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DIASPORA FUNDING AND INTERNAL INCOME SOURCES
Vilkko, Valter. “Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extrication.” Research Paper.
Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. March 2011.
http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/57537_MFS_paper_Vilkko.pdf
This report utilizes information taken from interview conducted with members of the Somali
diaspora who are residing in Nairobi, Kenya. Nairobi has become a major hub of Somali
trade and economic activity. The three areas of financial support that al-Shabaab receives
from external factors are diaspora remittances, donations from international jihadist groups
and monetary support from the state of Eritrea. The report’s main focus is on funding through
diaspora support. Financial support comes from Somalis living in the U.S., Europe, other
parts of Africa and the Middle East. As of 2008, outside donations seem to be down due to
the end of the Ethiopian occupation. The most common way of providing financial support is
through hawala money transfer companies. Cash curriers are still used but to a lesser extent.
Some businesses are believed to serve as direct funding sources for al-Shabaab. The Eastleigh
district of Nairobi is seen as a “little-Somalia” in Kenya and statements from those
interviewed for the report claim that it is known to the locals which businesses provide funds
to al-Shabaab, they just do not have fully concrete evidence and it would be dangerous to look
for it. A group of representatives from the Eastleigh district strongly denounce these claims
and al-Shabaab. Internal sources of financing for al-Shabaab come from taxation of homes
and businesses and forcing businesses and aid groups to pay protection money, along with the
Islamic charity tax called, zakat. The trade port of Kismayo serves as a major source of
income for al-Shabaab due to their shipping of illegal charcoal and sugar. Piracy also serves
as a source of income, not directly being conducted by al-Shabaab but by forcing pirates to
provide them with a cut of their profits.

Mezzofiore, Gianluca. “Eritrea Extorts UK Refugees to Fund Somalia’s al-Shabaab Islamist
Fighters.” International Business Times, July 29, 2013.
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/495268/20130729/eritrea-shabaab-somalia-diaspora-taxhorn-islam.htm
This article reports that Eritrean citizens and refugees living in the UK are being forced to pay
what is being called a diaspora tax by the Eritrean government. The money being taken from
this 2% income tax is reportedly being used to fund militant groups including al- Shabaab.
Many Eritreans in the UK do what they can to avoid paying this tax however tactics such as
voiding travel documents or threatening relatives still in Eritrea are used by the Eritrean
government to ensure payment.
25

IMPACT AND ROLE OF D RUGS IN FUNDING AND RECRUITMENT FOR AL-SHABAAB
Kan, Paul Rexton. Drugs and Contemporary Warfare. Dullas, VA: Potomac Books, Inc. 2009.
This book covers the production, sale, use and impact of various drugs on different conflicts
around the world. Many irregular conflicts often tend to be fueled by both the drug trade and
drug use. Revenues from drug sales are used to pay for continuing the conflict and the drugs
themselves are often taken before fighting or given afterwards as rewards. In addition, they
are used as a recruiting tool, either by offering criminals and addicts access to them or by
drugging civilians and children and impressing them into service. The role of the drug trade
and the use of drugs in Somalia is discussed and examined in this book along with several
other countries.

POACHING/WILDLIFE SMUGGLING
Stewart, Catrina. “Illegal Ivory Trade Funds al-Shabaab’s Terrorist Attacks.” The Independent,
October 6, 2013. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/illegal-ivory-trade-fundsalshabaabs-terrorist-attacks-8861315.html
This journal article describes the group’s involvement in ivory smuggling in east Africa. It
identifies common smuggling routes and ports. The broader link between poaching and terror
networks, as well as the challenges counterterrorism and law enforcement official’s face when
confronting the issue, including corruption and lack of manpower are described.\

Piracy
FUNDS FROM PIRACY/REPORTS ON RANSOMS
World Bank. "Pirate Trails" Tracks Dirty Money Resulting From Piracy Off the Horn of Africa”:
World Bank.. November 1, 2013. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2013/11/01/pirate-trails-tracks-dirty-money-resulting-from-piracy-off-the-horn-ofafrica
This press release states that between $339 million and $413 million was taken in ransom from
the hijacking of ships off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa between 2005 and 2012,
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according to a report released by the World Bank. This study was carried out by the World
Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and INTERPOL and reveals that much of
the ransom money was used to fuel a wide range of criminal activities on a global scale.

Karimi, Faith. “African pirates us millions of dollars in ransom on drugs, real estate, prostitutes.”
CNN World, November 2, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/02/world/africa/horn-of-africapiracy-loot/
This article by CNN shows the amount of money typically earned by different levels of pirate
organizations based off of ransom money taken and their spending habits. The lower level
members earn between $30,000 and $70,000 per vessel. The article states that the “kingpins”
earn the most money and often utilize it to finance future piracy operations, human trafficking
and militias.

INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTS
“Last Hijack Trailer.” YouTube Video, 1:30. Posted by “Submarine Trailer” February 6, 2014.
https://youtu.be/TaeC2NfUM7w
A documentary movie made with a combination of interviews, animation and story telling that
recounts the life of a Somali pirate. This movie also covers aspects of the history of Somalia
including the different tribal wars between the various clans and basic survival. The main
character, Mohamed recounts how he became involved in piracy and the aspects of that life
along with the increasing difficulties he faces due to enhance security and anti-piracy efforts.
See also, this additional clip from the movie. https://youtu.be/Va5hfin3Bvw
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF PIRACY
“Somalia’s Incredible Pirate Free-for-All.” YouTube Video, 19:07. Posted by “Journeyman Pictures”
July, 2011. https://youtu.be/oWRZfixUJik
This brief documentary provides a look at some of the root causes of piracy in Somalia, the
views of the pirates themselves, and the evaluation of current counter-piracy methods by outside
countries. The reporter interviews pirates, security officials, and local fishermen. One of the
highlighted problems is that the illegal overfishing of the area by various other countries had led
to a lack of resources and some desperate fishermen turned to piracy as a result. The security
forces interview state that the piracy problem needs to be dealt with from the coast and not from
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the sea and that they require aid in order to operate their own program as opposed to relying on
foreign navies to interdict pirates. The pirates that were interviewed describe the methods used
to capture ships and the extent of the ransoms they have received.

Murphy, Martin N. Somalia: The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011.
This book details the start of more overt and aggressive piracy off of Somalia when the targets
shifted from local and foreign fishing vessels to larger commercial vessels, both local and
international.

Refugees
Fleming, Melissa and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Yemen Arrivals Increase as
Horn of Africa Mixed Migration Hits All-Time Highs.” August 28, 2014. UNHCR.
http://www.unhcr.org/503ca18c9.html
This summary of UNHCR spokesperson, Melissa Fleming, remarks on the increased flow of
refugees from the HOA to Yemen. Residents of Somalia who flee to other countries are being
automatically classified as refugees due to the conflict in the area. During the first seven
months of 2012 there was a 30% increase in refugees from HOA to Yemen and in 2011 over
100,000 people made the crossing. These trips can be dangerous due to the reliance on illegal
boat crossings and smugglers.
In regards to recent dangers faced and the treatment of the refugees during the crossings see
the UNHCR article:
UNHCR. “2014 becomes the deadliest year at sea off Yemen.” UNHCR. October 17, 2014.
http://www.unhcr.org/544103b06.html
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Part II: Regional and Western Efforts to Counter al-Shabaab
HOA Counterterrorism/Law Enforcement
HOA GOVERNMENT POLICIES/PROGRAM
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). http://amisom-au.org/
The official website of the coalition of African nations engaged in peacekeeping and CI/CT in
Somalia. Their website provides information about the mission, press releases and other documents.
Horn of Africa. Civil Military Fusion Center.
https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/medbasin/Pages/Horn_of_Africa.aspx
CIMIC’s archives of materials on Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Works cover development,
security, and governance issues.
International Crisis Group. “The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia.” International Crisis
Group, Africa Report no. 184. February 15, 2012.
http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia
This report analyzes Kenya’s October 2011 troop deployment in Somalia. It identifies reasons
for the intervention, including enhancing its border security, stopping the influence of AlShabaab and to ease the flow of refugees. There are some concerns that the deployment could
result in the revisiting of old arguments and create new issues and possible lead to
radicalization of Kenyan Somalis.
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Also see the related ICG report, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization:
http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/kenyan-somali-islamist-radicalisation

EVALUATION OF CT EFFORTS
Roble, Muhyadin Ahmed. “Al-Shabaab: On the Back Foot but Still Dangerous.” Terrorism Monitor
13, no. 2 (2015): The Jamestown Foundation
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43441&tx_ttnews
%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=56e57cc675de12b04908ef7a07a35e7f#.VMpwLv54rYg
This article examines the impact of the Somali government and its allies capturing four major
towns from Al-Shabaab. Kenyan forces and a coalition of troops from Burundi, Djibouti,
Uganda, and Ethiopia also re-captured several towns and villages. A second offensive targeted
the financial aspects of Al-Shabaab by retaking several coastal towns, including the port of
Barawe, that were being utilized in the group’s multi-million dollar charcoal trade. Despite
facing setbacks in conventional fighting and in their finances, Al-Shabaab continued to launch
targeted attacks at government buildings and at civilians and infrastructure. The article
concludes that Al-Shabaab shows signs of adapting to its more limited presence but shifting its
tactics and finding new ways to raise funds.
Reuters. “Coastal killings in Kenya pose insurgency risk for Kenyatta.” Defence Web, July 11, 2014.
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35448&catid
=74&Itemid=30
The article reviews the security threats in Kenya and evaluates the government’s response to
these issues. Security concerns include the threat of militant groups including attacks by
al-Shabab and the discontent of coastal citizens in regards to their treatment and land
rights. There is concern that a separatist movement may develop in the coastal area.

West, Sunguta. “Kenya Unveils New Strategy for Tackling Terror.” Terrorism Monitor 14, no. 19.
(September 30, 2016). Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/kenyaunveils-new-strategy-tackling-terror/
Kenya’s recently announced National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NCVE) was
designed with the goal of utilizing a collective of government, private sector, civil society and
other areas to fully support CVE initiatives. A focus on counter radicalization will be featured
by the NCVE as opposed to former tactics that were often seen as controversial. The
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augmentation of the military response to al-Shabaab and other threats with counter
radicalization/anti-recruitment efforts are aimed to prevent target sections of the population
from joining these groups.

ANTI-PIRACY
OVERVIEW OF THREAT AND RESPONSE

Alessi, Christopher and Stephanie Hanson. “Combating Maritime Piracy.” Council on Foreign
Relations. March 23, 2012. http://www.cfr.org/france/combating-maritime-piracy/p18376
This article evaluates the threat of modern piracy and contains a section regarding the impact
of Somali piracy and the measures the international community has taken in order to
counter the problem.

UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION

United Nations. “Solving Somali piracy required effective state governance-UN.” Defence Web.
October 31, 2014.
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36818:solvin
g-somali-piracy-requires-effective-state-governance--un&catid=108:maritimesecurity&Itemid=233
This news article on the decline of incidents regarding Somali piracy states that a recent
decline in attacks is due to cooperation amongst the UN Member States and the maritime
industry. It is reminded that this is not a permanent solution and the attacks could return if the
current policies and programs, with a focus on the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy,
are not attended to constantly. Ultimately, it is concluded that if more countries and states act
against piracy and more local growth and development is encouraged in areas impacted by
piracy, continued progress can be seen.

“European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) Somalia: Countering Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia.” EU NAVFOR. http://eunavfor.eu/
This is the website of the European Union Naval Force Somalia. The site provides information
about the mission, facts and figures and latest news regarding the programs and operations of
the EU NAVFOR Somalia.
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U.S. RESPONSE TO GROWTH OF PIRACY

Shapiro, Andrew J. “Piracy Off the Horn of Africa” Remarks to the Center for American Progress,
Washington DC, March 27, 2012. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/186987.htm
Andrew J. Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
spoke at the Center for American Progress in 2012 regarding piracy off the Horn of Africa. He
spoke on the evolution of piracy into an organized operation, and U.S. response to Somali
piracy covering both diplomatic engagement and expanding security. Mr. Shapiro also
explains the added security measures that the private sector and shipping companies can take to
help deter piracy.

RESPONSE AND ANALYSIS

Reno, William. “Rethinking Counterinsurgency in Somalia.” CTC Sentinel, April 29, 2013.
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/rethinking-counterinsurgency-in-somalia,
This article covers the difficulties faced in organizing an effective counterinsurgency program
between government and local militia forces. The author discusses shifting policies of the local
government and how it can at times have connections to the militant groups it is fighting.
Local militias also face cohesion difficulties due to politics and individual clan loyalties.
Recommendations are made for managing different forces in a counterinsurgency program.

Strategic Aspects and U.S. Policy
IRREGULAR SECURITY THREATS/OVERVIEW
Le Sage, Andre. “Africa’s irregular security threats: Challenges for US engagement.” INSS CSR
Strategic Forum, no. 255 (2010): 1-25. Institute for National Strategic Studies.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=116242
This paper provides an overview of Africa’s irregular threats along with an analysis of their
strategic impact on regional stability. Issues include, arms smuggling, terrorist and militant
groups, drug trafficking, piracy, poaching, kidnapping and human trafficking, and several
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environmental threats. The national security interests of the U.S. in the continent are discussed
along with recommendations for enabling local government to address these security
challenges.

U.S. POLICIES AND REGIONAL PROGRAMS
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) www.hoa.africom.mil
The website of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa provides information about their
mission, programs and work with local HOA partner-nations’ military forces.
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) www.africom.mil/newsroom/documents
The website of the United States Africa Command provides information on their mission,
partnership programs, operations and security cooperation. It also provides fact sheets and case
studies along with transcripts of press briefings.

Byman, Daniel. "Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice." Foreign Affairs
92, no. 4 (2013): 32-43, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-dronesobama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman
This article argues that drone strikes are still a necessary part of counterterrorism operations. It
also makes the case that, as unmanned capabilities proliferate among global actors, the U.S.
government needs to identify a set policy in regards to drone usage on terrorist and terrorist
targets and adhere to it.

COUNTERTERRORISM /C OUNTERINSURGENCY
OVERVIEW AND CHALLENGES

Turbville, Graham, Josh Meservey and James Forest. “Countering the al-Shabaab Insurgency in
Somalia: Lessons for U.S. Special Operations Forces.” JSOU Report 14-1, Joint Special
Operations University. February 2014.
http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/al_Shabaab_Feb_2014%20PDF.pdf
This report provides brief overview of the history of Somalia and the formation of al-Shabaab
and then proceeds to describe the funding and recruitment methods followed by the
diminishment and evolution of al-Shabaab. The majority of the report covers the different
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challenges facing counterinsurgency in Somalia, the impact of current CI/CT efforts, and
lessons based off of this research for U.S. Special Forces that could be utilized in that area. The
ample selection of endnotes provides additional research areas.

Healy, Sally and Ginny Hill. “Yemen and Somalia: Terrorism, Shadow Networks, and the
Limitations of State-building.” Chatham House, October 2010.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109494
This paper compares the counterterrorism challenges presented by non-state actors in Yemen
and Somalia. Both of these countries are marked by economic hardship, locally perceived
ineffective governments, and the presence of illicit trade networks. U.S. intervention and actions
can be deemed as attacks and threats by citizens of both countries and can lead them to siding
with militant and radical groups. This factor can outweigh the impact of the aid and nation
building missions. The authors also advise awareness in regards to residents of both countries
who have immigrated elsewhere. They still have the possibility of becoming radicalized. There
is also the concern regarding shadow business networks supporting these group

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM/INSURGENCY POLICY

Sheehan, Michael A, and Geoff Porter. "The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism Operations In
Africa." CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (2014): 1-3 https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-future-role-of-us-counterterrorism-operations-in-africa
This article begins by evaluating Operation Serval in 2012, an operation conducted by France
and Chad with U.S. logistical support, and the lessons learned from it. In the wake of Operation
Serval, concerns regarding the growth of new threats are directed at the poverty level and
mismanaged and sometimes absent local governments. This combination of desperation and
lack of government assistance/support could lead to the growth of militant groups. In addition,
the various tensions between different religious and ethnic groups in these areas can be a factor
as well. In conclusion, the author points out that coordination between different terror and
militant groups across the continent should be monitored.

Schmitt, Nicholas, Kulish, Eric, and Mark Mazzetti. “Target in U.S. Raid on Somalia Is Called Top
Shabab Planner of Attacks Abroad.” New York Times, Oct. 6, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/africa/target-in-us-raid-on-somalia-is-called-topshabab-planner-of-attacks-abroad.html?_r=0
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This article describes an unsuccessful October 2013 Navy SEALs raid in Somalia designed to
capture Ikrimah, a top Shabaab militant. The importance of ensuring that the risks of the
operations justify the results is discussed along with the message that the raid sent regarding the
U.S.’s willingness to intervene.

Schmitt, Eric and Mark Mazzetti. “Pentagon Says Shabab Bomb Specialist Is Killed in Missile Strike
in Somalia.” New York Times, October 28, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/africa/pentagon-says-shabab-bomb-specialist-iskilled-in-missile-strike-in-somalia.html
This article evaluates the October 2013 missile strike against Shabaab explosives specialist
Ibrahim Ali as possibly indicative of a shift in U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the region. The
authors express that there is some concern that these actions could serve to turn al-Shabab’s
attentions to America.
Lake, Eli. “Obama’s Not-So-Secret Terror War.” The Daily Beast, July 24, 2012.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/24/obama-s-not-so-secret-terror-war.html
This article summarizes a 2012 UN report outlining suspected covert U.S. counterterrorism
activities in Somalia, including the provision of intelligence, training, equipment and the
deployment of American forces.
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